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FEATURE ARTICLE
Discount Medical Plans and the Consumer:
Health Care in a Regulatory Blindspot
By Gerard Britton*
"That's right buddy, the large print giveth, and the small print taketh
away.'

I. Introduction
The increasingly high cost of health care coverage has
precipitated the emergence of a novel health care coverage product:
"the discount medical plan." 2 Discount medical plans claim to help
reduce the cost of medical services to the uninsured by acting as
brokers between consumers and a network of contracted providers
who will perform medical services at a discounted fee. 3 These plans
* Assistant Prosecutor, Chief of the Insurance Fraud Unit, Office of the Morris
County Prosecutor, Morristown, New Jersey; J.D., New York Law School, 1990.
The author wishes to thank Mila Kofman, J.D., Tyler Chin, American Medical
News, and Michael Paiva for their help in finding information for this article.
1 TOM WAITS, Step Right Up, on Small Change (Elektra/Asylum 1976).
2 There are a variety of health related discount plans that are marketed to the

consumer. Most offer services that include some or all of the following discounts:
prescription; dental care; vision care; and alternative medicine. Moreover, because
the discount plan market is new and in flux, some discount medical plans differ
from the basic model in the way that they apply discounts and process claims. For
purposes of this article a discount medical plan is defined as one that offers to
provide access to treatment by a physician and/or a medical facility, such as a clinic
or hospital, but does not accept or disburse money for the payment of claims.
3 See Robert Lowes, Caveat Doctor! Medical Discount Cards Could Burn
You, MEDICAL ECONOMICS (Feb. 19, 2001), http://www.memag.com/
becore/search/show article-search.j sp?searchurl=/be core/content/j oumals/m/
data/2001/0219/selfpay.html&title=Caveat+doctor%2 l+Medical+discount+cards+
could+bum+you&navtype=m&query=CAVEAT (last visited Aug. 8, 2003).
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are promoted as a viable and affordable alternative for those who
cannot afford traditional health care coverage and appear attractive to
the uninsured and those who have high-deductible health insurance
policies.4
Although various plans differ, a common feature of all of
these plans is the promise of significant discounts for physicians'
services and hospitalization costs. 5 The plans tout substantial
discounts for "in-network" provider services and promise these
savings at a slight fraction of the cost of health insurance. 6 The plans
do not involve insurance companies; consumers are solely
responsible for the payment of their health care bill.7 The plans are
marketed aggressively via Internet websites, email messages,
telemarketers, and infomercials. 8 The marketing accompanying these
plans mimics that of traditional health plans. The plans have been the
subject of criticism on several fronts. For example, the plans are
being used as a vehicle for fraudulent enterprises, 9 mislead
consumers into believing that the plans represent health insurance
coverage,' ° exaggerate the level of discount that consumers actually
receive for these services, 1 and present provider lists that are grossly
inaccurate. 12
In response to the proliferation of companies offering these
plans and the attendant complaints, advisories have been issued by
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Tyler Chin, Cards Promise Discounts, Deliver Headaches,
American Medical Association (May 19, 2003), http://www.ama-assn.org/scipubs/amnews/pick_03/bil20519.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
6 See, e.g., Trudy Lieberman, Discount Card Isn't Insurance, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2002, at S1, availableat 2002 WL 2504118.
7 id.
8

What to Consider When Looking at "Discount Medical Plans," Better

Business Bureau (May 18, 2002), http://www.bbb.org/library/discountplans.asp
(last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
9 See generally Mila Kofman, et al., Proliferationof Phony Health Insurance:
States and the Federal Government Respond, Bureau of National Affairs, Fall
2003, at 20.
10 See Lieberman, supra note 6.
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., Susan Lundine, Medical Cards Prompt Call For Inquiry,
ORLANDO BUSINESS JOURNAL (Nov.

25, 2002), http://www.bizjournals.com/
orlando/stories/2002/l1/25/story2.html?jst=srsrhi (last visited Aug. 8, 2003);
Lowes, supra note 3.
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14
3
various attorneys general,1 state consumer protection agencies,
insurance departments,' 5 and better business bureaus.' 6 These groups
have alerted consumers of the hazards of these plans. The media has
also notified the public of dissatisfied consumers who bought into
plans that did not live up to their advertising promises or consumers
who were7 enrolled in a discount medical plan without their

approval.'
See Iowa Attorney General Advisory, Health "Discount Cards"-A
Prescription For Wasting Money? (Aug. 4, 2002), http://www.state.ia.us/
government/ag/consumer/advisories/discountcards.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2003)
[hereinafter Iowa Attorney General Advisory]; New York State Attorney General
Discount Cards, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
Health and Rx
Guide,
consumer/discount rx brochure.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2003).
14 Vermont Division of Health Care Administration Consumer Tip, Discount
Health Plans-What Consumers Should Know, http://www.bishca.state.vt.us/
consumpubs/hcatips-pubs/discount health..plans.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2003).
15 Colorado Division of Insurance & Colorado Attorney General Publication,
13

What Consumers Should Know About Discount Health Plans (Oct. 2002),
http://www.dora.state.co.us/insurance/pb/hdp02.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2003)
[hereinafter Colorado Division of Insurance & Attorney General Publication];
Delaware Insurance Department, PrescriptionDrug and Medical Services Discount
Cards (May 6, 2002), at http://www.state.de.uslinscom/DiscountCards.htm (last
visited Aug. 7, 2003); Kentucky Department of Insurance Consumer Alert, Health
Discount Plans (Aug. 2, 2002), http://doi.ppr.ky.gov/Kentucky/Documents/
consumer/unauthorizedins.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2003); Louisiana Department
of Insurance Consumer Alert, Wooley Warns Global Telemarketing Scam has
Claimed Louisiana Victims (Sept. 12, 2003), available at http://www.ldi.state.la.us/
public affairs/press releases/telemarketing%20scam.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2003); Oklahoma Insurance Department News Advisory, Consumers Warned
at
available
29,
2002),
(Mar.
Insurance
Scams
About
(last visited Oct. 6, 2003);
http://www.oid.state.ok.ushotnews/index.html
Washington Office of Insurance Commissioner Publication, Considering Discount
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/publications/consumer/
(Mar.
2002),
Plans
DiscountPlans.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
16See Lieberman, supra note 6; Federal Trade Commission Alert, Bogus
Medical Discount Plans: A Bitter Pill (Feb. 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
conline/pubs/alerts/medplanalrt.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003); Be Wary of Health
Discount

Cards,

CONSUMER

REPORTS

(May

2002),

http://www.consumerreports.org/main/detailv2.jsp?CONTENT%3C%3Ecntid= 15
3399&FOLDER%3C%3Efolderid=18151&bmUID=1020466010079 (last visited
Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Wary of Health Discount Cards].
17See, e.g., Lundine, supra note 12; Michelle Arnold, Some Health Discounts
May Be No Bargain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, § 3, at 8; Barbara Marquand,
Companiesfind market for Discount Health Cards, SACRAMENTO Bus. J. (Apr. 14,
2003), at http://sacramento.bizjournals.com/ sacramento/stories/ 2003/ 04/ 14/
focus4.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2003); Gallagher Offers Warning on Medical
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Moreover, the issue of discount medical plan fraud was
recently addressed in a Bureau of National Affairs Report, discussing
the problem of phony health insurance. 8 In February 2003, Canadian
authorities, working with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
brought criminal charges against two discount medical plan
companies that had been operating telemarketing "boiler rooms" in
Toronto. 19 The companies used high-pressure sales tactics and
deceptive practices to swindle consumers.2 ° Recently, Hawaii's
Better Business Bureau challenged the advertising claims of a major
discount plan. 2 1 And, currently, in California, there is a legislative
effort to specifically regulate these plans. 22 At least one civil suit has
been filed seeking damages and injunctive relief against a discount
plan company in California.2 3
Yet, despite the apparent proliferation of companies offering
such plans, the apparent concern of regulators and watchdogs, the
anecdotal evidence of consumer deception and fraud, and the
potential for increasing abuses, 24 there appears to be little research
Discount Cards, ST.
AUGUSTINE
REC.
(June
7,
2003),
at
http://www.staugustine.com/stories/060703/com_1580619.shtml (last visited Sept.
12, 2003); Press Release, Montgomery County, Maryland, Duncan Announces top
10
Consumer Scams for 2001
(Mar. 5,
2002),
available at
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/mc/news/press/02-96.html
(last visited
Sept. 4, 2003).
18 See generally Kofman, supra note 9.
19 See

News Release, Canadian Bureau of Competition, Competition Bureau
Investigation Leads to Criminal Charges Against Individuals Engaged in
Crossborder Deceptive Telemarketing and Fraud (Feb. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/ffc979db07de58e6852564e400603639/852
56a220056c2a485256cd30069708c!OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 6, 2003);
Press Release, FTC, Canadian Operation That Charges U.S. Consumers Without
Authorization Challenged By The FTC (Feb. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/02/medplan.htm (last visited Oct 6, 2003).
20 See id.
See Lyn Danninger, Local BBB challenges Care Entrge ad Claims,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 11, 2003, available at http://starbulletin.com/
2003/08/1 1/business/story3.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
22 See Marquand, supra note 17.
21

See Karima Haynes, Suit Claims Discount Health-Care Firm Failed to
Deliver,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at B3, available at 2003 WL 2428978.
24 The current movement to implement some form of govemment-supported
private prescription drug "plans," as laudable as it is, will only increase the avenues
by which unscrupulous operators, working in a an unregulated market, can don a
cloak of legitimacy while defrauding consumers. See Patricia Barry, Prescription
23

2004]

Discount Medical Plans and the Consumer

available for consumers on important aspects of the discount medical
plan market. Similarly, there is virtually no information available on
the level of interest in these plans, the current usage of plans, the
level of satisfaction of enrolled consumers, the overall impact of
these plans on the uninsured consumers, or the legitimacy of the
claims made by the companies offering them.
Moreover, unlike traditional health care plans, discount
medical plans do not operate under any state or federal health
insurance regulations. Because the plans bear no responsibility for
processing or payment of medical claims, they are exempt from the
regulatory framework developed in the health insurance market,
meant to ensure the integrity of health insurance products and to
25
protect consumers.
This article first defines the basic elements of discount
medical plans and explains the proliferation of companies offering
them. The article then explores the issues and problems related to
these plans in the context of consumer protection and the current
status of state regulation of these plans. Finally, the article advances
an argument for more formal study of the impact of these plans on
the uninsured consumer and suggests potential consumer protection
remedies to prevent abuses inherent in these plans. Ultimately, the
article is intended to inspire discussion about how these plans affect
consumers and what actions the states and the federal government
should take to protect consumers.

II. Discount Medical Plans
In theory, discount medical plans are based upon contractual
relationships with providers and offer a price reduction to the
consumer. First, a discount medical plan purchases a list of network
providers and a discount fee schedule from a Preferred Provider
Organization ("PPO").2 6 A PPO is "a health care financing and
delivery program that provides financial incentives to consumers to

Drugs-Getting to yes on an Rx Drug Bill, AARP Online Bulletin (Sept. 2003),

http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/prescription/Articles/a2003-08-28-rx-drugbill.html
(last visited on Oct. 6, 2003).
2 For an overview of regulatory structures monitoring traditional health care
plans, see Eleanor Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About
Health Care, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 335, 358-62 (2000). See also National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, A tradition of Consumer Protection, at

http://www.naic.org/about/background.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
26

See Chin, supra note 5.
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utilize certain 'preferred' providers. 27 The PPO also contracts with
providers who agree to accept reduced fees in exchange for the
promise of a patient base created by the PPO. 28 In exchange for an

initial fee from the enrolled consumer, the discount medical plan
issues a card to the enrolled consumer that ensures the PPO
29
discounted rate for services rendered by the PPO network provider.
The consumer agrees to a set of conditions for the discount to
apply. 30 The crucial requirement is that the consumer must pay the
discounted cost of service in full at the time of treatment.3 1 The
32
discount medical plan does not make payments or reimbursements.
The discount medical plan system is predicated upon a set of
interlocking, contractual agreements: discount plan restrictions on the
34
and the PPO;
enrolled consumer; 33 agreements between the plan
35

and agreements between the PPO and the provider.
A discount medical plan operating properly within this
framework would potentially offer savings to some consumers. For
instance, uninsured consumers who could pay for the cost of their
medical care would save money. 36 Such a consumer, enrolled in a
properly performing discount medical plan, would be entitled to the
contractually defined discount upon which the PPO and provider
agreed.37 However, there have been significant problems associated
with the influx of discount medical plans into the health care market.
The reasons for this influx, as well as a description of some of the
H. Ward Classen, Provider-Based Preferred Provider Organizations: A
Viable Alternative Under PresentFederalAntitrust Policies?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 253,
27

255 (1988). See also American Association of Preferred Provider Organizations,
PPOs-A Leading, Proven Health Care Delivery Model, at http://www.aappo.org/
ppo-about.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2003).
28

See Classen, supra note 27, at 255.

The initial fee is typically several hundred dollars, and the monthly payment
usually costs between $20 and $90. See Lieberman, supra note 6.
30 See, e.g., Lieberman, supra note
6.
29

31
32

id.
Id.

33 Id.

34 See Chin, supra note 5.
35
36

See Classen, supra note 27.
See, e.g., Marquand, supra note 17.

3 See Lowes, supra note
3.
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attendant problems, are discussed in the sections below.
A. The Proliferation of Discount Medical Plans
Four primary factors have contributed to the emergence of
discount medical plans: (1) consumer expectations; (2) the rising cost
of traditional health care coverage and the emergence of PPOs; (3)
the complexity of the health care system combined with consumer
assumptions about traditional protections; and (4) the gap in
regulatory oversight in the health care field resulting from the
existence of PPO contracts. These factors are further discussed
below.
1. Expectation vs. Cost
Among its other maladies the American health care system
suffers from schizophrenia. Americans believe that quality coverage
should be a basic right available to everyone.38 This belief is most
likely based on the realization, and a correct one, that insurance
coverage is the sine qua non of access to adequate medical
treatment.3 9 However, while the public acknowledges the basic need
for coverage and believes that it should be almost concomitant with
citizenship, the reality is that mani Americans actually have little
access to adequate health coverage. 0 In 2002 over 43 million people

38See Kaiser Family Foundation, Newshour Uninsured Survey (Jan. 2000),

http://www.kff.org/healthpollreport/templates/reference.php?page=6_2000_01 &fea
ture=feature3 (last visited Aug. 8, 2003). In this survey the Kaiser Family
Foundation ("KFF') asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed that health
care should be provided equally to everyone, just as public education is. KFF
posted the following results of the survey:
Agree Strongly - 62%
Agree Somewhat - 22%
Disagree Somewhat - 8%
Disagree Strongly - 7%
Don't Know - 1%
39See Kaiser Family Foundation-Commission on Key Facts, The Uninsured

and Their Access to Health Care (Jan. 2003), http://www.kff.org/content/
2003/142004/142004.pdf (last visited on Aug. 8, 2003).
40 The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 43.6 million Americans were
uninsured for the entire year, an increase of 2.4 million people over the previous
year. See U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage 2002 Highlights,
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under the age of 65 had no health insurance. 4 1 The cause is clear:
expense. 4 2 The cost of premiums for employer-sponsored health
insurance rose almost 14 percent between the spring of 2002 and the
spring of 2003. 43 These increased costs are borne by both the
employer and employee.44
Moreover, those seeking individual insurance policies face
prohibitive premiums and significant burdens concerning access to
insurance.45 The resulting picture is somewhat grim. Those without
coverage must obviously make do without health care or struggle
financially to obtain it. On the other hand, those fortunate enough to
be in an employer-based plan find their rates escalating at an
alarming pace. 46 In either case consumers incur significant costs to
obtain access to health insurance. Increased costs are driving many
people into the precarious situation of foregoing insurance altogether
and risking financial calamity in the event of serious illness.
2. The Rising Costs of Health Care and the PPO
During the 1990s, spiraling costs led to the emergence of the
Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"). 4 7 Although HMOs were
designed to constrain costs, the attendant restrictions they imposed on
consumers led to the development of a new managed health care
model: the PPO. 48 PPOs gained favor in the early 1990s because they

http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hlthin02/hlth02asc.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2003).
41 Id.
42

See

generally, Kaiser

Family

Foundation-Health

Research

and

Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits 2003 Summary of Findings (2003),
http://www.kff.org/content/2003/20030909a/SOFv2.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2003)
[hereinafter Kaiser 2003 Employer Health Benefits Summary].
43

id.

44id.
45

See Kaiser Family Foundation-Commission

on Medicaid

and the

Uninsured, Lack of Coverage: A Long-Term Problem for Most Uninsured (June

2003), http://www.kff.org/content/2003/4120/4120.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
46 See Kaiser 2003 Employer Health Benefits Summary, supra note 42.
41 See Alliance For Health Reform, Covering Health Issues: A Sourcebookfor

Journalists (2003), http://www.allhealth.org/sourcebook2002/index.html
visited Oct. 28, 2003).
48 See Classen, supra note 27.

(last
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promised a managed care system more flexible than the HMO. 4
Unlike many HMO models that restrict access by consumers to
network providers and use a fixed payment-per-patient system, PPOs
allow patients to go outside the network of _providers and do not
impose a flat reimbursement rate to providers. PPO agreements are
based upon a contract between the PPO and the provider that
provides, in part, the schedule of payment for specified medical
services. 5 Separately, the PPO and the payor each enter into a
contract with the third-party
payor, which is typically an insurance
52
company or employer.
The benefits of the PPO system to the provider are a larger
patient base and the assurance of payment by the payor, typically an
employer, a union, or a health insurance company. 53 In exchange the
PPO network provider
agrees to provide services to PPO members at
54
rate.
discounted
a
There are also benefits to the patient. The patient has a large
provider list from which to choose and retains the ability to go
outside the PPO network, although at a higher cost. 55 Under a PPO
plan the patient has to provide a co-payment as additional cost
control. 56 In 2000 revenues from PPOs
57 accounted for 26 percent of
gross income for family practitioners.
The contractual cracks in this system through which the
discount medical plan industry grew involve the definitional
ambiguity of many contracts between PPOs and providers. First,
providers normally agree in contracts with a PPO to allow the PPO to
49 See Lieberman, supra note 6.
50

Id.

51 See Classen, supra note 27, at 255.
52

id.

53 id.
54Id.
55 id.

A co-payment, or co-insurance, is a portion of the bill for a medical service
that is. not covered by the health insurance policy and must be paid by the patient.
51 See Ken Terry, Survey Report, Managed Care: Could You Live Without it,
MEDICAL
ECONOMICS
(Dec.
3,
2001),
http://www.memag.com/
becore/search/showarticle-search.j sp?searchurl=/be core/content/journals/m/dat
a/2001/1203/w2_1 cmancare.html&title=Survey+Report+--+Managed+care%3A+
Could+you+live+without+it%3F&navtype=m&query=managed+care+terry
(last
visited Aug. 1, 2003).
56
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sell access to the "payors." 58 In older contracts the term "payor," the
entity that would pay the bulk of the bill for services rendered, was
either ill-defined or not defined at all. 59 The prevailing assumption
implicit in these agreements was that the "payor" would be a thirdparty payor.60 Self-paying patients represent a risk that physicians do
not contemplate when contracting with a PPO.61 Second, these
contracts often did not limit the PPOs right to sell or lease these
provider lists.62 Because many older contracts did not define the term
"payor," its scope was open to interpretation. 63 Consequently, a
cottage industry developed. Third-party "brokers" emerged and,
unbeknownst to providers, bought or leased schedules and provider
began offering
lists from PPOs or other brokers. 64 These brokers then
65
directly.
end-users
to
services
care
health
discount
3. Health Care System Complexity and Consumer
Assumptions
Along with the greater costs of health care, decisions about

health care coverage are increasingly borne by the consumer. In
addition to being uninsured, those who find themselves without
health care coverage because they are either unemployed or
,employed at a job that provides no health care benefits are faced with
securing coverage within a system about which they lack
knowledge. 66 Some workers, although eligible for insurance coverage
through some form of employer-based group coverage, often face
increased costs in the form of employee contributions to premium

58

See Lowes, supra note 3.

59 id.

60 id.
61 Id.
62

See Chin, supra note 5.

63

See Lowes, supra note 3.

64 id.
65

id.

66 See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Brief Executive Summary,
Consumer Health Care Finances and Education: Matters of Values, No. 241 (Jan.
2002); Michael Housman, Can Managed Care Consumers Make Informed
Decisions, HARVARD HEALTH POLICY REVIEW, Vol. 3, No.1 (spring 2002).
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67
payment, increased deductibles, and a co-payment schedule.
Traditionally, consumers' health care choices have involved a
straightforward analysis of plan cost versus coverage. 6 8 However,
during the last two decades, with the waxing of insurance costs,
waning of insurance indemnity programs, and proliferation of
managed care models, employees have been forced to exercise more
thought about their health care coverage. 69 Unfortunately, consumers
lacked the knowledge to rationally evaluate the merits of various
health care plans.7 °
Still, under the traditional framework of statutory protections,
ill-informed consumers enjoyed a certain degree of protection. 7' For
the most part, consumers did not have to consider the methodology of
the payment system to the provider because the regulatory framework
operated to insure basic stability and predictability for the
consumer. 72 All consumers who sought health insurance received
basic protections because virtually all commercial health insurance
73
plans were regulated by the state agencies. Each state maintained an
agency74 to act as the watchdog over the administration of health care
plans.
Nevertheless, the traditional fee-for-service health care model
left consumers unprepared for and uneducated about the health care
choices facing them. This has been illustrated by studies that have
examined the issue of consumer familiarity with their health care
benefits. The fact is that many insured consumers have little
understanding of their own health benefit plan or of the various types
of health plans that now exist. 76 The average consumer is not
prepared to make competent decisions in an unregulated market.
The lack of affordable coverage has forced consumers to
confront a complex health care market, without the benefit of

68

See Kaiser 2003 Employer Health Benefits Summary, supra note 42.
See Housman, supra note 66.

69

Id.

70

id.

71

See Kinney, supra note 25, at 358-62.

72

id.

71

Id. at 358-59.

67

74 id.

75 Kinney, supra note 25.
76

See Housman, supra note 66, at 2-3.
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experience, training, or information.77 Moreover, the assumptions
embedded in the traditional, regulated health care market have made
consumers particularly vulnerable to bad
78 decision-making when
market.
unregulated
new
a
with
confronted
4. The Gap in Regulatory Protection
The array of state and federal legislation and rules that
regulate the health care system are constrained by their definitional
framework. State health plan and insurance watchdogs have
consistently found that, because discount medical plans do not bear
any financial responsibility for payment or processing of claims, they
are not a form of insurance coverage and therefore are not subject to
regulation. 79 Because discount medical plans are not regulated in the
same way as health insurance products, they avoid the cost and
structural restrictions attendant with compliance, as well as the
80
scrutiny of insurance regulators. This is a significant incentive for
legitimate entrepreneurs and unscrupulous operators to create
discount medical plans.
B. Problems Associated with Discount Medical Plans
The reasons given above for the proliferation of discount
medical plans reflect, to a certain extent, the problems that have
arisen with them. The summary below describes the more prominent
issues associated with discount medical plans: benefit uncertainty;
deception and fraud; and the lack of regulatory oversight.
1. Uncertainty of Benefits due to Contractual Ambiguity
There have been fundamental questions raised about the basic
value of even legitimate discount plans. 8 1 For example, does the

77 id.
78

Telephone Interview with Mila Kofman, Assistant Research Professor,

Georgetown University Institute for Health Care Research and Policy (Dec. 22,
2003).
79 See Colorado Division of Insurance & Attorney General Publication, supra
note 15.
80 See infra Part.II.B.3 (observing that discount medical plan complaints are
currently handled by the consumer protection units of the state attorneys general).
81 See Chin, supra note 5.
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consumer get anything in exchange for the cost of the plan? 82 Often,
because providers are ignorant of their putative association with the
plans as "network providers," their health providers either refuse to
honor the cards presented by enrollees or misconstrue them to be a
type of third-party payor plan. 83 In those cases providers are forced to
submit bills to patients and contend with the very type of billing
problems providers expected to avoid. 84 Perhaps, discount card
holders would do as well without the plan by negotiating a discount
85
directly with the provider prior to service. Without the existence of
direct contractual arrangements between brokers and providers acting
as the foundation for discount plans, the discount medical plan
industry is unlikely to ever appear completely legitimate.
2. Marketing Deceptions and Fraud
Discount medical plan marketing often mimics the look and
feel of traditional health care plan marketing. 86 However, discount
medical plans are not insurance or a managed health care product.
Although many plans indicate that they are not insurance, such a
disclaimer may be couched in phrases that suggest that the plan is
superior to insurance. For example, the plan may proclaim that it is
not insurance, but rather "a health care savings program that provides
access to the medical services all Americans need and deserve.",87 Or,
the plan may advertise that, although it is not health insurance, it is
"an innovative new approach to health care., 88 To an ill-informed
consumer these claims may well appear reasonable. Anecdotal
evidence, demonstrating that consumers as well as providers
mistakenly treat the plans as a form of a third-party payor
these
The alimitations
notion. 89
to this
arrangement,
is faced
when
consumer of
apparent
may credence
only become
discount planslends

82

Id. at 23.

83

See Lowes, supra note 3.

84 id.
85

Chin, supra note 5.

86

Lieberman, supra note 6.

87

Lundine, supra note 12.

88 id.
89

See Lowes, supra note 3.
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90
with a serious need for medical services.
A more fundamental question is whether disclaimers
effectively inform the average consumer. 91 A disclaimer does not
inform the consumer of the impact of canceling an insurance policy
or deciding to forego the cost of an insurance plan and opting for a
discount plan-the effect of a coverage lapse on insurability,
portability, and pre-existing conditions, for example. A simple
statement that a product is not insurance most likely appears to the
average consumer to be more of an informational bite, perhaps even
more of a commercial claim, than an effective warning.
Another problem with discount medical plans involves
exaggerated claims of discounts. 92 This practice has led to action by
attorneys general in some states.93 For example, the Iowa Attorney
of
General's Office sued one plan for the exaggeration of claims
94
consumers.
to
refunds
issued
ultimately
plan
the
and
savings,
Similarly, many plans prominently claim access to "network
provider" lists, but providers are often unaware that they are listed
and are not willing to accept the cards when presented.95 Consumers
often learn of a provider's ignorance about the plan and
unwillingness to accept the plan card only when medical services are
needed.9 These examples help explain the skepticism expressed by
many observers of this market. An entire health care benefit
industry that promises discounts from providers, who are unaware of
the existence of these types of plans, surprised to be listed by a plan
as affiliated providers, and not willing to honor the discounts
promised, should draw consumer suspicion.
These exaggerations are all made in the plan's marketin
pitch, whether by Internet ad, telephone, e-mail or "infomercial."'

90 See Lieberman, supra note 6.
91 See Wary of Health Discount Cards, supra note 16.
92 id.

93 Id. See also Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General,
Savings From Medical "Discount Cards" Questioned (Aug. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/augl3b_02.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2003).
94 See Wary of Health Discount Cards,supra note 16.

95 See, e.g., Iowa Attorney General Advisory, supra note 13.
96 See Lieberman, supra note 6.
97 See supra notes 8-12.
98 Lundine, supra note 12.
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The existence of foreign-based discount medical plan scams
99
reinforces the skepticism surrounding these marketing campaigns.
Indeed, the two largest discount medical plan scams uncovered so far
originated in Toronto. 100 In those cases fraudsters, Global Discount
Healthcare Benefits ("Global") and Med Plan, opened boiler room
operations in Toronto and, under the disguise of offering discount
medical plans, signed up people who had only requested information,
gathered identifying information on thousands of people, and
deducted assets from their accounts. 10 The ability to operate within
the United States without any legitimate commercial presence or
licensing requirement only2 facilitates fraud by telemarketers in this
critical consumer service.1
3. Regulatory Vacuum
State regulatory agencies have consistently demurred when
03
confronted with discount medical plan problems and complaints.
Discount medical plans do not fall within the definition of the type of
plans that are regulated by those agencies. 04 The critical features that
distinguish the discount medical plan from its regulated cousins are
the absence in discount medical plans of the responsibility for both

99 See FBI, Economic Crimes Unit Telemarketing Fraud Investigative
Program, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/ec/about/about_tm.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2003).

1oo Press Release, FTC, Canadian Operation That Charges U.S. Consumers
Without Authorization Challenged by the FTC (Feb. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/02/medplan.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
101

Id.

102

See Betty Sexton, Discount Medical Plan (KKTV television broadcast,

June 12, 2002), availableat http://www.kktv.com/news/features/2/13656.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2003).
103 See generally supra note 15.

'o4 Because discount medical plans bear no financial responsibility for
payment of services, insurance regulators maintain that the plans are not within
their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Daniel Zingale, Director's Opinion 01/1, California

Department

of

Managed

Care

(issued

June

7,

2001),

http://www.hmohelp.ca.gov/library/regulations/discount/director.pdf

available at
(last

visited

Oct. 6, 2003) [hereinafter California Department of Managed Care Director's
Opinion]. Director Zingale's opinion effectively deregulated the discount medical
plan market in California, which had been regulated under the Knox-Keene Act.
See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1345 (2003).
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making or processing the payment of claims.' 0 5 Similarly, discount
plans fall between the cracks of federal regulation. By dealing
directly with the consumer as a mere discounter, plan brokers avoid
the regulatory
oversight common to the traditional health care
16
market. 1
Consequently, consumer complaints in regard to discount
medical plans are generally handled by the attorney general's office
of each state as part of its function to protect consumers. 1° 7 State
consumer protection units field complaints from a large number of
consumers and address a wide array of problems.-0 8 Moreover,
agencies that do monitor consumer complaints derive their authority
from the pertinent statute or regulation that addresses consumer
protection.
Although all states have laws that sanction deceptive
advertising in the form of exaggerated claims, many states have no
law that expressly regulates the form or practice of these discount
plans. As discussed in the next section, the scope of regulation varies
greatly in the states that do regulate discount plans.

III. Current State Regulations
The emerging quilt of state regulation in the area of discount
medical plans has focused on several key aspects: (1) notice to the
consumer that the plan is not insurance; (2) contract provisions
between the provider and the plan; (3) deceptive practices by the
plan; (4) origin of services requirements for the plan; and (5) surety

105

See California Department of Managed Care Director's Opinion, supra

note 104.
106 See, e.g., Wary of Health Discount Cards, supra note 16.
107 State

advisories about discount medical plans direct complaints to their
attorney general's office. See Colorado Division of Insurance & Attorney General
Publication, supra note 15.
108 For example, the Bureau of Consumer Frauds of the Office of the New
York State Attorney General fields complaints that include: advertising; auto sales;
charities; computers and the Internet; credit and lending; furniture delivery; health;
housing; identity theft; investing; and telecommunications issues. See Office of the
New York State Attorney General, Consumer Issues, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
consumer/consumerissues.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) [hereinafter New York
Attorney General Consumer Issues].
'09 See, e.g., Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Consumer Issues, at
http://www.ag.state.az.us/consumer/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2003); Office of the
Attorney General of New York, Consumer Complaint Forms, available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/complaints/complaints.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
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requirements imposed on the plan.
Nine states require discount plan companies operating within
cards indicating that
their borders to display a notice on their discount
1 1 Georgia; 11 Idaho;' 12
the plan is not insurance: Arkansas;
Illinois; 113 Kansas; 114 Oklahoma; 115 Tennessee;11F Texas; 17 and
Utah." 8 These statutes address the concern that consumers often
mistake discount medical plans to be a form of third-party
insurance.' 19 In addition Utah requires that all ads and materials
contain a disclaimer advising the consumer that the plan maintains no
liability for guaranteeing providers or the quality of services
received. 120
Eight states require that discount medical plans be authorized
by a separate contract with the provider: Arkansas;' 2 1 Geor a; 122
Idaho; 123 Illinois; 124 Kansas; 125 Oklahoma; 126 Tennessee; 12 and
Texas. 128 These provisions address the concern that providers are
unaware of their participation in the plan and are perhaps unwilling to

"0 ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 4-106-201(1) (2003).

...GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(32)(A) (2003).
112 IDAHO CODE § 48-1601(1) (2003).
1"3 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2B.3(1) (2003).
114 KAN. STAT. ANN.
115 OKLA.

§ 50-1,101(b)(1) (2002).

STAT. § 1219.4(B)(2) (2002).

116TENN. CODEANN.

§ 47-18-2701(1) (2003).

117TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
118UTAH

§ 17.46(b)(18)(B) (2003).

INS. REG. R590-152-4(E)(1) (effective July 16, 2003).

"9 See generally supra notes 110-118.
120 UTAH INS. REG. R590-152-4(E)(3) (effective July 16, 2003).

121ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-106-201(2) (2003).
122GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(32)(B) (2003).
123IDAHO CODE § 48-1601(2) (2003).
124ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2B.3(2) (2003).
'25 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1,101(b)(2) (2002).
126 OKLA. STAT. § 1219.4(B)(1) (2002).

127TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2701(2) (2003).
128TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(18)(A) (2003).
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honor any discount that the plan promises.' 29 None of these statutes,
however, define what constitutes a separate contract. Therefore, it is
unclear whether a set of contracts among PPOs, discount medical
plans, brokers, and consumers satisfies this requirement.
Five states have laws that specifically define and prohibit
deceptive practices by discount medical plans: Idaho; 30 Illinois; 3 '
Kansas;132 Oklahoma;'33 Tennessee;134 and Texas. 135 Nonetheless, the
statutes are silent as to the proper agency to conduct the investigation
and prosecution of violations under these provisions. Perhaps, the
offices of the state attorneys general would handle violations under
these statutes.
Some states have imposed residency or bond requirements on
discount plan companies to assure that consumers have some form of
meaningful redress in case of loss.' 36 Georgia, for example, requires
discount companies to accurately state the location of the "source" of
the discount medical plan and to refrain from misleading the public
as to the location of the business,' 37 and Kansas requires that discount
38
plans obtain and file surety bonds with the Secretary of State.'
Additionally, Kansas requires plans to provide, in some
139
circumstances, a right to cancel a discount medical plan contract.
Despite these differences, sanctions for violations of these statutes are
consistent. State statutes generally mandate a minimum $10,000 fine
for violations, damages, and other court-imposed
relief, which could
140
presumably restrict further operations.
No state currently requires any licensing or certification as a

129

See generally supra notes 121-128.

130

IDAHO CODE

§ 48-1601(3) (2003).

131 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2B.3(3) (2003).
132

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1,101(a), (b)(3) (2002).

133 OKLA. STAT. § 1219.4(B)(3) (2002).
134 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2701(3) (2003).
135 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(18)(C) (2003).
136

See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(4)(A) (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-

1,101 (b)(6)(A)-(E) (2002).
137

GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(4)(A) (2003).

138

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1,101(b)(6)(A)-(E) (2002).

139

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-1,101(b)(4)(B) (2002).

140

See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. § 1219.4(C) (2002).
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prerequisite to companies or agents offering discount plans. 141 Unlike
traditional insurance, anyone can contract with a discount medical
plan provider to promote the plans.' 42 Consequently, multi-level
layers of marketers between plan
marketing schemes often employ
43
enrollees and the plan itself.
Furthermore, current discount medical plan statutes do not
address the issue of patient confidentiality. The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") does not cover
discount medical plans. Thus, it is unclear what duties these plans
have to secure the confidentiality of any medical information that
they maintain, or safeguard the privacy of the personal and account
information in their possession.'
Finally, as noted above, there is no state law requiring a
discount plan to disclose information that might impact potential
consumers' decisions to enroll in a discount medical plan. 45 Further,
issues such as pre-existing conditions and subsequent insurability are
left to the consumer to discern on his or her own.

IV. Discussion Points and Suggested Changes
The impact on consumers of the discount medical plan market
is impossible to gauge because there has not yet been any formal
research or investigation conducted on the subject. No nationwide
data exists on either the number of enrolled people or the number of
complaints logged about the plans. No studies have been conducted
to determine the percentage of providers listed by plans who are
unaware of their "participation" in the network. Moreover, no
141California and Kentucky did require some form of licensing, but both states

rescinded the requirement. See California Dept. of Managed Care Director's
Opinion, supra note 104; KENT. REv. STAT. §§ 304.38-500, -510, -515 and 304.43140 (repealed 2002).
142 See Marquand, supra note 17.
143 Id.
'44 This concern has been addressed in many of the advisories issued about
discount medical plans. See Colorado Division of Insurance & Attorney General
Publication, supra note 15.
145 In 2002 California State Senator Jackie Speier introduced a bill that would
have, in part, required discount medical plans to advise consumers that the plan's
benefits might duplicate existing insurance benefits and that consumers might be
eligible for free or reduced-cost government benefits. The bill did not pass. See
Marquand, supra note 17.

146 See generally sources cited supra notes 13-15.
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comprehensive investigation has been made of the companies that
promote these plans or the multi-level marketing schemes that are
often employed by the plans. Although there is anecdotal evidence of
the concern about the value of discount medical plans, there appears
to be no assessment of the value of plans to consumers who have
attempted to use physician and related services under these plans.
Research needs to be conducted to determine the present state
of affairs and future trends for the discount medical plan market.
Given the latest statistics on the ever-increasing cost of health
insurance, there is reason to believe that interest in discount plans
will also increase. The information gathered, and subsequent
analysis, will help determine the level of regulatory safeguards that
are warranted.
Consumers also need to better educate themselves about
health care benefits, specifically about the risks inherent in choosing
a health care plan, 1 7 particularly when considering a discount
medical plan. Unfortunately, as noted above, consumers presently
have little in the way of resources, other than their state consumer
affairs bureau, to help determine the merits of any competing
plans. 148 Unlike the state of affairs in the area of unlicensed health
insurance scams, which are illegal per se and can be uncovered by a
call to the state insurance department, 149 consumers are truly on their
own when contemplating a discount medical plan.
Perhaps, a nationwide consumer awareness campaign is
warranted. Presently, news articles, state advisories, and issued
consumer alerts have only educated consumers in the most general
sense. An effective campaign will need to be based upon reliable
information, such as the number of people enrolled in each plan, the
percentage of doctors listed by plans who actually honor discount
cards, the number of complaints logged against a plan, and the
discount realized for common medical services. The FIC should
maintain a specific clearinghouse for the anecdotal information from
as many sources as possible. Ideally, this clearinghouse would
include information on complaints from Canadian and Mexican
consumer agencies, individual consumers, and state agencies
entrusted with monitoring discount medical plans. 50 A
14' For a discussion of the perils lurking in the health care market, see

Kofman, supra note 9.
148

See generally sources cited supra notes 13-15.

149

Id.
For a summary of efforts in this direction, see Press Release, Competition

150
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comprehensive federal monitoring system is necessary to stay ahead
of the fraud curve.
Contracts between providers and PPOs should specifically
define to whom the PPO may sell provider lists and discount fee
schedules. Not only would consumers benefit from clearly defined
contract terms, but providers would also benefit because they would
then be able to determine who would have access to the PPO
discount. Further, they would be able to reliably assess risks and
benefits of contracting with a particular PPO.
State agencies should be required to monitor discount medical
plans. Although some state agencies have asserted, sometimes with
good reason, that they are not empowered to regulate discount
medical plans,1 51 the need for oversight is becoming increasingly
apparent. Consumer protection agencies within the offices of the state
attorneys general are required to address a wide spectrum of
consumer complaints and cannot be expected
to handle regulation of
52
an entire health care market on their own.'
Discount medical plan companies should require licenses in
each state in which they operate. In most states consumers seeking
insurance can contact a state agency to confirm that an insurance
company is licensed. 153 Presently, consumers cannot contact an
agency to determine the legitimacy of a discount medical plan.
Discount medical plan companies should also be liable for conduct of
any entity that promotes their plan. These measures would prevent
the type of multi-level marketing that breeds fraud.
Moreover, discount medical plans should be required to
maintain an actual commercial presence within the United States. The
attorneys general of each state, as well as the FTC, should have the
authority to enjoin from further operation within its jurisdiction any
discount medical plan company that is found to be operating from a
foreign country while maintaining a United States "shell" address.
This requirement would ensure that any discount medical plan
operating in the United States could be effectively brought within the
jurisdiction of a state or federal agency for regulation and also within
Bureau of Canada, Bringing Down the Barriers to Effective Enforcement on Crossborder

Health

Fraud

(issued

June

19,

2003),

available at

http:/fcb-

bc.gc.ca/epic/internet/incb-bc.nsf/vwGeneratedlnterE/ct02582e.html
(last visited
Sept. 2, 2003).
151 See, e.g., California Dept. of Managed Care Director's Opinion, supra note
104.
152 See
153

New York Attorney General Consumer Issues, supra note 108.

See Kinney, supra note 25, at 358.
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the reach of civil litigants for redress of complaints.
Discount medical plan companies should also be required to
file a description of the terms of the plans and the benefits promoted,
including published rate schedules for treatments. Without some
provision for establishing what discounts will be provided,
unscrupulous providers and plans could simply claim to offer a
discount to plan enrollees without actually providing consumers with
any reduction in price.
Furthermore, discount medical plan companies should be
required to provide all enrollees with a written summary of plan
benefits, costs, and provisions. All plans should be required to
explain the possible consequences of opting for a discount plan in
lieu of health insurance. Enrollees should be guaranteed a time period
within which they can back out of a plan without penalty. Without
such a window, consumers might be forced to forego costly
"activation fees" in order to back out of a plan.
Finally, state statutes that address discount medical plan
requirements should clarify that "separate contracts" means direct
contracts between any company, its agents, as well as any
independent broker selling discount plans, and the provider who is
listed as an in-network member.

V. Conclusion
The cost crisis existing in the health care industry has exposed
a significant percentage of the population to the uncertainties of
assessing and contracting for health care coverage without the
assurance of governmental safeguards. Some consumers have been
left to confront an unregulated marketplace in their quest for one of
their most critical needs: health care. 15 Given this reality, the threats
posed by the discount medical plan industry should not be trivialized.
True health care coverage will become more unaffordable, and more
consumers will be increasingly desperate to reduce these costs.
Moreover, discount plans will become more sophisticated in their
marketing approaches and will lure more consumers into their plans.
The practices, value, and impact of the discount medical plan market
are currently unclear. Thorough examination is warranted.
What is clear is that caveat emptor is not a sufficient response
to discount medical plans. Health care is too important. Consumers

154 See Jeffrey Hines, Telemarketing Fraud upon the Elderly: Minimizing its
Effects Through Legislation, Law Enforcement and Education, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. &

TECH. 839 (2002); see also Kofman, supra note 9.
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deserve the type of safeguards that are in place in the consumer
insurance arena. A concrete example of some of the most severe
abuses observed in the unregulated and unmonitored discount
medical plan market might serve to illustrate the potential hazards.
Author Barry Dennison related his experience as an unwitting
telemarketer inside the Toronto-based Global, one of the fraudulent
companies that targeted American consumers. In February 2003
Canadian authorities raided Global's headquarters. In the article
Dennison shed light on some of the dangers presented by an
unregulated health care market:
Staff were given lists of banks and credit unions in each
state, including route and branch numbers. So if the
respondent mentioned a bank's name, the telemarketer
could easily match the name/address of the bank in their
city. This gave the impression that Global Healthcare
already had the account and that the respondent just had to
verify the rest of the number.
I observed that once the front-line telemarketer got the
bank account number, a supervisor would take over the
phone call to re-confirm all of the consumer's
information-on tape. I described all this in my affidavithow we were encouraged to get a rhythm going with the
caller, saying "yes" to all their personal information so they
wouldn't listen and would automatically agree to an
"activation fee." Often the customer didn't understand that
the activation fee was actually $359 being taken out of their
account.
Curious about whether my skepticism had any basis, I
began an Internet search. I hadn't yet scored a sale, and
when I discovered sites full of consumers complaining that
they didn't know they'd authorized the removal of money
from their
account, I was pleased with my poor sales
55
record.

Dennison, Boss, You're Busted-My Adventures in a Telemarketing
Boiler Room, Now MAGAZINE ONLINE EDITION, Vol. 22, No. 27 (Mar. 6, 2003), at
155 Barry

http://www.nowtoronto.com/issues/2003-03-06/news-story6_p.html
Sept. 2, 2003).

(last visited
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Consumers in need of vital health care services simply
deserve to be protected from this type of predatory conduct.

